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Trial delays are the bane of the American legal system. The system
has become so backlogged that a typical plaintiff may have to wait five
years for trial of a simple personal injury claim.' If there is an appeal,
a final disposition of the case may occur ten years after plaintiff has
been injured.
While many practitioners acknowledge the severity of the problem,
little has been done to reduce unnecessary delays. This article appeals
to legislators to address this crisis before the judicial system deterio-
rates to the point where laymen will be tempted to circumvent the legal
process entirely.
Lawyers are so accustomed to the law's delays that they tend to
disregard the message of the cliche, "Justice delayed is often justice
denied." Consequently, they treat a delay in litigation as an occupa-
tional disease or as an inside joke. Yet, access to a fair hearing is not a
joke. Most lawyers and judges familiar with civil or criminal trial prac-
tice agree that the most critical problem is delay in either trying or
disposing of the cause.
A recent case brings that point into focus. A year ago I traveled to
San Diego with witnesses, experts, and clients, having been assured
that we would go to trial. The presiding judge practically laughed at
my naivett. The case was continued to a date two months later. On
that date I appeared once again before the presiding judge. While not
chiding my naivet6, he assigned the case to a "day certain" three
months hence. Appearing with the litigants "three months hence," I
was told, with a measure of sympathy, that the case would indeed be
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1. ABA ACTION COMM. TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, REPORT. (Oct. 1980).
An attorney interested in psychology should consider comparing the description of the
incident giving rise to a cause of action by a witness immediately after the incident occurred
with the narrative supplied by the same witness after five years has passed. For an enlighten-
ing report of the psychology of memory and the problems of the passage of time on witness
recollection, see Loftus, The Eyewitness on Trial, TRIAL, Oct. 1980, at 31. Professor Loftus
describes tests on memory retention conducted at the University of Washington which sug-
gest that the passage of time is a critical factor in witness reliability.
The Law's Delay
tried if I came back December 5. Nevertheless, the clerk took me aside
and told me, "There's no chance that you will be heard on that date."
This case was four and one-half years old. Although the litigation
was nearing California's mandatory five-year limit for dismissal, little
could be done in the face of the bureaucracy's inertia. This experience
at the San Diego Superior Court is neither novel nor extraordinary. It
is not uncommon in United States courts for a case to be called four
times before it is litigated. Indeed, in Chicago, New York, and other
jurisdictions, a case initiated today would not be heard for four or five
years. This delay will result even if both parties are ready for trial
within six months.2
After a five-year delay, the judgment becomes more a reward to a
diligent litigant than an award to a deserving victim. A worker, who is
permanently incapacitated and has a family to support, can hardly af-
ford to wait five years to receive an award. Hospital bills, doctor bills,
house payments, food bills, and educational fees must be paid in the
interim. If a claimant cannot be "carried" by his lawyer and is ineligi-
ble for governmental relief, he must discount his eventual award to an
extent that would be usurious in a commercial transaction.
Such delay produces little respect for the American judicial system
and raises questions about the quality of justice. How can a witness,
assuming that he can be located, testify accurately after so many years
of delay? Ignoring inaccuracies in proof, a plaintiff can obtain a judg-
ment on paper after a five-year delay. The case is usually appealed,
however, and in a jurisdiction such as the Ninth Circuit, an appeal is
not decided for three to five years. During this period further changes
occur not only in the plaintiffs everyday world but also in the legal
world. By the time the appellate decision is reached, the legal climate
could be completely different from that which prevailed at the time of
trial. I am convinced that the time between filing a complaint and pro-
ceeding to trial could be reduced to less than one year. Bold steps are
required, however, to halt the disintegration of the legal system.
THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM
It is manifestly unfair to require a litigant to wait ten years for a
decision. The legal process, trial or appellate, need not consume so
much time. Although trial delays have been recognized as a problem
for years, little has been done to reverse the trend toward the decade-
long lawsuit.3 It is not enough to observe that these delays are unneces-
sary. Legal scholars and respected practitioners should identify the
causes of the current problems and then work to eliminate them.
The following four factors are principal causes of trial delays: (1)
2. T. CHURCH, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 94-95
(1978).




the inefficient management of the court system by the judiciary; (2) a
tremendous increase in litigation; (3) the philosophy of procrastination
of many judges and lawyers; and (4) the priority of criminal over civil
cases on the court calendar. In order for cases to be heard within a
reasonable period of time, these four problems must be corrected.
Concern over trial delay was evident in the late Nineteenth and
early Twentieth Centuries, when court delay was the subject of inter-
mittent courts of inquiry. These inquiries effected changes in the rules
of procedure, but addressed few of the other causes of delay.4 The situ-
ation has become progressively worse, as intervals between incident
and judgment lengthen.5
The Judge as Administrator
In the middle of this century, a change occurred which transformed
trial delay from a problem into a crisis.6 This was a new philosophy
regarding the role of judges. The efficiency of the court system became
as much a part of the judge's responsibility as the wise administration
of justice.7 As one commentator noted:
In part, the new outlook is a complement to basic changes in procedu-
ral doctrine to permit easy pleading, easy amendment, and easy discov-
ery, with attendant risks that a lawsuit may produce waste or abuse if
left to the unsupervised control of the lawyers. In 1938, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure had confirmed the coming of age of the new
procedural philosophy. It was in that conteyt that a decade or so later
the custodians of American justice looked closely at the way the civil
courts were discharging their duties-and recoiled.8
Sadly, few judges today are better administrators of the court system
than were those of thirty-five years ago. Cases are delayed for little or
no reason, and discovery is allowed to run amok, with only a pretense
of control. Few efforts are made to employ modem management theo-
ries. As a result, the chaos continues. 9
The Rise in Litigation
The need for competent judicial management of the court system
either has been caused by or, at least, accompanied by an explosion of
4. Rosenberg, The American Assembly, the Courts, the Public, and the Law Explosion, 2 COURT
CONGESTION: STATUS, CAUSES, AND PROPOSED REMEDIES 30 (1965).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 31.
7. FRIESEN, supra note 3, at 8. "The Institute of Judicial Administration which exists in an
academic climate has from time to time contributed substantially to the growth of thought
about the administration of the courts." Id.
8. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 31.
9. FRIESEN, supra note 3, at 13. "Judges and lawyers--except where educational efforts have
been expended, interpersonal skills developed, or unusual attributes possessed-are not par-
ticularly suited to deal with the problems of management. Their interests are channeled
toward their professional training. This causes them to see legal problems where manage-




litigation. From 1962 to 1970 the number of civil cases awaiting trial in
California's eighteen largest counties practically doubled.' I Each year
the number of civil cases filed in California exceeds the number of
cases decided by the courts."l
Federal courts have staggered under a similar increase in the
number of cases filed. Statistics released by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts show the dramatic increase in litigation
over the last ten years. In 1969, 87,321 civil cases were terminated; as
of June 30, 1970, 93,207 civil cases were pending. At the end of 1979,
154,666 civil cases had been filed, an increase of 77.1% over the same
period in 1970. During that same year, 143,323 civil cases were termi-
nated; 177,805 civil cases were pending. Thus, over the nine-year pe-
riod ending in 1979, although the number of civil cases terminated rose
78.2%, the number of civil cases pending increased 90.8%.12
While blaming the unnecessary litigiousness of the American peo-
ple for trial delays provides a convenient scapegoat, this explanation
merely begs the question. Despite obvious excesses, much of the in-
crease in litigation results from belated judicial or legislative recogni-
tion of valid causes of action. Contingency fees and more realistic
appraisals of anachronisms such as privity of contract have made it
possible for almost anyone to "have a day in court." Most of these
cases are legitimate, and the judicial system must adapt to the volume
of cases litigated.
Attitudes of Lawyers and Judges
The increase in litigation undoubtedly exacerbated the problem of
trial delays, but that increase is not the crux of the issue. As the Na-
tional Center for State Courts states, the "single most important factor
in delay is not lack of judges, number of cases per judge or use of a
particular calendaring system-it is the climate in which judges and
lawyers operate; they become accustomed to a particular pace and ex-
10. [19711 REPORT OF AD. OFFICE OF CAL. CTS. 100-26. The 1980 Report of the Judicial Coun-
cil of California indicates that for the fifth successive year, some of the metropolitan superior
courts reported a worsening of the conditions of civil calendars. [19801 REPORT OF THE JUD.
COUNCIL OF CAL.
11. Id. at 100-26. See Doyle, Battle of the Backlog, COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY SELECTED
READINGS 92 (G. Winters ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED READINGS]. Doyle dis-
cusses the backlog problem in Colorado and the Colorado Assembly's attempt to solve the
problem. Colorado has created a Judicial Department in charge of improving the adminis-
tration of justice in Colorado. Doyle suggests once a long period of waiting is an established
fact, the filing rate increases and many reviews are filed for strategic purposes. Delay serves
to improve the bargaining power of the parties. Thus the battle of the backlog becomes even
more a losing fight by reason of the existence of a bulk of undecided cases. Id. at 93.
12. [1979] ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS 4-7. It should be noted the same does not hold true for criminal cases. For the year
preceeding 1970, 39,959 criminal cases were commenced, 36,319 were terminated with 20,910
pending. For the year ending 1979, 32,688 criminal cases were filed, 33,411 were terminated





Most trial lawyers procrastinate by nature. When a case comes into
a lawyer's office, an automatic response is to file a stipulation for an
extension of time. The case file then lies on the lawyer's desk while
discovery and investigation is delayed for months, to the detriment of
the case and ultimately of the client. Once the trial lawyer has been
retained, he may fail to work on the case as assiduously as he had
worked to secure it. Furthermore, judges (nisi prius and appellate)
often adhere to the same philosophy of lethargy, which must be
changed before we can cut through the Gordian knot of trial delays.
The problem, at least on the part of plaintiffs lawyers, is one of
attitude rather than of reality. Even the most complex case can be pre-
pared for trial within a year. The average case can be fully prepared
within six months. 4 There is no need for delay at the client's expense.
Indeed, as the end of a mandatory dismissal period approaches, a case
is tried with alacrity. Few cases in California are extended beyond the
five-year period.
Economic reality often makes it beneficial for defense attorneys to
delay trial as long as possible. Even if the plaintiffs counsel is diligent,
the defendant usually attempts to blunt the opponent's initiative, and
judges are generally quite amenable to the postponement. Any solu-
tion to the problem of trial delays must make this delay unattractive to
the defendant as well as to the plaintiff.
Civil versus Criminal Cases
When civil litigants are prepared to go to trial they are often
thwarted, even after they enter the courtroom. Pressing criminal pro-
ceedings, made more urgent by such legislative enactments as the
Speedy Trial Act, 5 routinely force civil litigants to postpone their tri-
als. Any criminal matter automatically takes precedence over a civil
suit. Litigants who are prepared, even eager for trial, must await dispo-
sition of the most trivial criminal matter. This results in further delay.
Unfortunately, the framers of the Constitution were unable to pre-
dict society's evolution. Had they been more prescient, they would
have recognized the importance of having the courts negotiate peace
and common sense in the daily living patterns of the citizenry. Prompt
resolution of civil disputes has become as important as the efficient dis-
patch of criminal justice. Regrettably, the Constitution does not guar-
antee that in all civil litigation, the parties shall enjoy a right to a
speedy and public trial.
13. Hufstedler & Nejelski, AB4 Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66
A.B.A. J. 969 (1980).
14. FRIESEN, supra note 3, at 63. The "rule of thumb" norm of six months reflects the period
that is commonly considered adequate for preparation of most cases.




The causes of trial delay appear, therefore, to be fourfold: ineffi-
cient judicial administration; a vast increase in litigation; the attitude of
lawyers, fostered by incentives for defense lawyers to delay; and,
finally, the priority of criminal over civil matters. In order to relieve
the resulting congestion, procedural changes must be effected in the ju-
dicial system. Broad and innovative reforms, reinforced by effective
sanctions, are necessary. I recommend four proposals as solutions:
(1) Appointment of surrogate judges (auditors, referees, judges pro
tempore) to handle certain cases;
(2) The imposition of interest accruing retroactively from the time of
incident, rather than from time of judgment, to remove defend-
ants' incentives to delay;
(3) The elevation of civil cases to parity with criminal cases so that
civil cases will not be usurped; and
(4) A requirement that judges set definite trial dates and honor them,
so that litigation cannot be delayed by one of the attorneys.
Surrogate Judges
While people must be able to protect their legal rights, adequate
protection does not necessarily require adjudication under formal trial
procedure. Many cases do not justify such a significant investment of
time and resources.
We should draft court rules to provide either for compulsory arbi-
tration or for some other quasi-judicial disposition of certain lawsuits.
New York initiated a system in which suits for damages of less than a
statutorily determined amount must be submitted to arbitration. The
arbitrator decides these smaller cases; any dissatisfied litigant can re-
turn to court to obtain a trial by jury. Only 5% of the litigants in Bronx,
Broome, Monroe, and Schenectady Counties of New York requested a
trial after pursuing the arbitration procedure.
16
The concept of relying upon substitute judges promises relief from
court delays, whether or not arbitration proceedings are required.
Massachusetts has pioneered the use of auditors or referees in lieu of
judges in motor vehicle tort cases. 7 Under Massachusetts practice, the
court-appointed auditor hears and reports on a variety of cases. Audi-
tors are practicing attorneys who take time from their practice to serve
in that capacity. They report their findings of facts and conclusions of
law to the court. The parties may accept the auditor's report as final or
request a trial. If the case goes to trial, the auditor's findings are prima
facie evidence and may be read to the jury.
16. Press release of State of New York Court of Appeals in Albany, N.Y. (Feb. 7, 1980). The
New York Plan also calls for shorter vacations and increased bench time for judges and for
expanded arbitration of civil cases involving $6,000 or less to 17 additional counties.
17. Allessandroni, Arbitrators, Auditors, Referees, Pro-Tern Judges, in SELECTED READINGS,
supra note I1, at 164.
19811
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Appointing pro tempore judges from the ranks of commissioners,
retired judges, and lawyers is another variation of this theme. Trial
judges, who cannot hear the case on the appointed trial date could as-
sign it to a 'ro tern" judge. This judge would be empowered to make
a ruling subject only to the normal avenues of appeal.
The use of surrogate judges would greatly reduce the pressures on
trial judges. It is axiomatic that more traditional judges must be ap-
pointed as the number of claims continues to rise. Substitute judges,
however, should be able to handle many simple suits, allowing trial
judges to adjudicate more effectively those cases which require a trial
judge's expertise.
Delay by Counsel
Both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel tend to delay trial, albeit
for different reasons. Often delays are caused by mere laziness on the
part of plaintiffs attorney. To combat this, I suggest that the 40,000
members of the American Trial Lawyers Association pledge that they
will try their cases when called and that they will not continue cases for
any reason. To enforce this pledge, the rules of professional conduct
could be amended to permit imposition of sanctions by the court in
clear cases of delay by attorneys. Given these incentives, plaintiffs' at-
torneys would be much more likely to pursue their cause diligently.
Any plaintiffs attorney who unnecessarily delays a trial is almost
certainly doing his client a disservice. Often, counsel will plead impos-
sibility: the office's only trial lawyer is occupied elsewhere. Because it
is so important to speed up court calendars, a trial lawyer who is un-
available when his case is called should substitute someone else in the
office. If that is unavailing, an outside lawyer should be hired. The
cost to both attorney and client would be returned in increased and
speedy litigation.
Defense counsel, on the other hand, often serves his client best by
delaying trial indefinitely. Delay not only exhausts plaintiff's resources
but also allows defendant to keep his money and draw interest from it.
To counter this incentive for delay, we ought to follow the Alaska rule:
interest on any judgment accrues from the date of the incident, rather
than the date of judgment. 8 Alaska provides for eight percent interest
on a judgment from the date of injury. I also suggest that the rate of
interest be raised to at least ten percent, with a five percent surcharge if
the judgment was higher than the settlement offer.
18. State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1970). As the court explains, "For a cause of action to
accrue, one party must have breached a duty to the other, and the other must have been
injured at the moment the cause of action occurred; the injured party was entitled to be left
whole and became immediately entitled to be made whole. Whenever any cause of action
accrues, therefore, the amount later adjudicated as damages is immediately 'due'. . . . All
damages then, whether liquidated or unliquidated, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, should carry
interest from the time the cause of action accrues, unless for some reason peculiar to an
individual case such an award of interest would do an injustice." Id. at 274.
[Vol. 8:16
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Today, an insurance company which must pay a million dollar
award can earn the amount of that award, if it can hold the client's
money during protracted litigation. Thus, the insurance company ob-
viously seeks postponement of trial. Its desire to delay would wane
considerably if its ultimate liability were increasing at the rate of fifteen
percent. In many tort suits, this reform alone might end the problem of
trial delays.
Parity of Civil Suits with Criminal Cases
Throughout the United States, all action in a civil suit must halt
whenever a criminal action comes before the court. Recently, I tried a
case in federal court in Orlando, Florida. One of the witnesses had
been flown in from Australia at a cost of $5000 per day. On the "day
definite" for trial, I was told that a criminal case had usurped our place
on the calendar. We waited over six months before the second calling.
By that time I was unable to try the case; other counsel handled the
litigation.
Civil cases should have equal status with criminal cases. Genera-
tions of lawyers have respected the slogan, "human rights above prop-
erty rights," but we must recognize that in many cases property rights-
that is, rights adjudicated in civil suits-are just as important as speedy
criminal justice.
A modem bail bond system could help insure a workable court
docket. Bail should be used in conjunction with more extensive per-
sonal recognizance programs. These two alternatives, when used as
they were intended, would prevent the criminal defendant from usurp-
ing the civil litigant's place on the trial calendar.
Efficient Administration of the Courts
Mandatory Pretrial and Settlement Conferences. The most effective
way to avoid trial delays is to insure that only cases requiring trial ever
reach that stage. Mandatory pretrial conferences held within ninety
days after the suit is filed are an excellent means of avoiding senseless
litigation. Even if settlement is not the main objective of the confer-
erice, it is often a result of the conference. This practice also saves court
time by shortening those trials that subsequently take place. The con-
ference expedites the ensuing trial by eliminating surprise, sharpening
issues, and increasing knowledge of the case. For these reasons, some
legal scholars consider the pretrial conference the salvation of the judi-
cial system in the Twentieth Century.' 9
19. Wright, "The Pretrial Conference," Seminar on Practice and Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 141, 142
(1960). Wright advocates pretrial as "one of the greatest steps forward, but he warns of the
burden that is now placed on the pretrial conference. Pretrial was intended to make cases
easier, to save lawyers' time, to save litigants' expense. It wasn't intended that pretrial be just
another layer on the judicial cake .... [Piretrial was intended to eliminate some of the
paper work that goes into litigation, into the preparation of a lawsuit. . . . [U]nless some
19811
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Other commentators, however, view the conference as a waste of
time, another procedural hoop for counsel to leap through before
reaching trial. They point out that local custom often treats these con-
ferences as superfluous exercises attended by junior associates who lack
authority to enter into binding stipulations. Thus, the pretrial confer-
ence can be a senseless duplication of effort for which the client must
pay.
20
Pretrial conferences need not, however, be mere formalities. In
New York City's Conference and Assignment System, pretrial confer-
ences have played an integral part in court reform.2 ' Inaugurated in
February 1970, this system assigns teams of three judges per caseload.
One judge serves as Conference Judge, a rotating position. The other
judges share the responsibility of hearing the civil case. Every team
disposes of 450 to 750 cases each month.22
The Conference Judge calls between twenty-five and fifty cases per
day, four days a week. His goal is to settle, adjust, or otherwise dispose
of sixty percent to seventy percent of these cases. The remaining cases
are either held for further conference or assigned for immediate trial to
one of the two assignment judges on the team. This system stresses that
"now" is the time for settlement, rather than "later." It is the court's
business to clear its calendar. Counsel on either side do not have the
prerogative to delay.
Critics of the system say that New York's "crash" program pres-
sures settlements, that it is a method bred of despair. They claim that it
is unfair to both parties and, indeed, makes the court a marketplace for
bargaining and chaffering.23 I am convinced, however, that such a sys-
tem could decrease court delay. A specially trained Judicial Adminis-
trator could supervise the progress of civil litigation within any court
system. The administrator would assign cases to specific conference
and assignment teams based on their expertise in various stages and
types of litigation. For example, one team might be expert at settle-
ment conferences in divorce cases; another might be more experienced
in pretrial conferences in personal injury cases. The civil litigant could
expect his case to conclude within a reasonable time. The problem lies
in enforcement of such a solution: how does one insure that attorneys
and parties to a civil suit do their utmost to settle at the pretrial confer-
ence?
In 1972 California's Select Committee on Trial Court Delay recom-
effort is made to bring the pretrial back in focus, it is going to suffer the same fate as com-
mon-law pleadings." Id. at 142.
20. See, e.g., M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE: A CON-
TROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION 12 (1964).
21. New York Breaks Court Backlog, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 11, at 136. "The civil
court of the City of New York has had dramatic result in cutting delay. Not only has there
been a considerable decrease in the courts' pending caseload, but there also has been a sharp
drop in the number of months it takes to bring a case to trial."
22. Id. at 136.
23. Oleck, "hat to Do about Delay in Court, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 11, at 73.
[Vol. 8:16
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mended a method producing effective pretrial conferences.2 4 In the
nine years since it was proposed, no action has been taken on the Com-
mittee's recommendation. As a result, the congestion in California
courts has continued to increase.
The Committee's proposal is not unique. It uses substantial mone-
tary incentives to insure that all parties to an action enter the pretrial
settlement negotiations in good faith. The Committee suggested that
[a] new section should be added to the Code of Civil Procedure provid-
ing that all civil actions in the Superior Court in which money dam-
ages are sought, the parties shall enter into good faith pretrial
settlement negotiations accompanied by written demands and offers
filed with the clerk of the court, and that after trial these demands and
offers shall be presented to the court, which may in its discretion after a
hearing award to any party, or apportion between the parties, all costs,
attorneys' fees, expert witnesses' fees, or any of these, which were in-
curred after the demands and offers were filed, as well as interest on
the amount of the judgment.25
After conclusion of a case, the court could analyze all aspects of the
case, whether at the pretrial and trial stages. As the Committee ex-
plained,
After the trial, the trial judge examines the demand, the offer, the judg-
ment rendered, the evidence heard at the trial, the proceedings in gen-
eral, the costs and fees incurred by the parties, and the settlement
negotiations undertaken. If the court finds, based on its examination
of these items, that the defendant was unreasonable or acting in bad
faith in making his offer, the court may then order the defendant to
pay the plaintiffs costs, attorneys' fees, and expert witness' fees which
were incurred after a specified date, or any portion thereof, along with
interest on the amount of the judgment from any date after the com-
plaint was filed.26
Pretrial Procedure and Discovery Modications. Assuming that the
case cannot be settled at the pretrial conference, a timetable must be
established for the litigation. At the outset, it would be quite valuable
for courts to differentiate between simple and complex cases (for exam-
ple, slip and fall cases versus antitrust matters). Although complex liti-
gation cannot be completed within six months, the average personal
injury case can easily be accommodated within that time. These simple
cases should be processed more rapidly, with shorter periods between
each successive stage of litigation. In this way, those cases which re-
quire time will receive it, while those that do not will be disposed of
quickly and efficiently.
27
24. CAL. SELECT COMM. ON TRIAL COURT DELAY, REP. 6 (1972).
25. Id. at 44.
26. Id. at 47.
27. SONOMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT ANN. REP. (1979) (available upon request from Supe-
rior Court, County of Sonoma, 200-J Hall of Justice, Santa Rosa, California 95401). The
Sonoma County Court system consists of: a vigorous settlement program, requiring all long
19811
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Each phase of the litigation is slowed considerably by the necessity
of arguing motions in court. This process could be streamlined in civil
cases by arguing motions in telephone conference calls. The judge
could make tentative ruling over the telephone after papers had been
filed. If the ruling is not contested, it would become final. This prac-
tice has been adopted, with some success, in at least one California
county.28
The litigation process could be further shortened by imposing limi-
tations on the number of pages filed or issues addressed in memoranda
and trial briefs. Because judges are often overwhelmed by the support-
ing papers filed in many cases, a restriction on verbiage in required
pleadings would help to eliminate or shorten delays. Indeed, judges
might find that they have time to consider concise legal arguments
presented by diligent counsel. The purpose of filing trial briefs would
be to sharpen issues, rather than to obfuscate them.
A significant cause of court delay is abuse of discovery proce-
dures. 29 To avoid this egregious waste of time and energy, the court
should limit the number of interrogatories, depositions, and requests
for admissions in a typical lawsuit. In an extraordinary case a petition
might be granted to relax these limits, but generally the parties would
observe the limitation on discovery. In addition, at a certain point fol-
lowing the filing of the suit, a time limit should be placed on all discov-
ery proceedings. Again, exceptions would be granted in exceptional
cases, but discovery would be completed within a set period of time in
the majority of cases.
To make these constraints effective, I suggest imposition of stiff pen-
alties for the improper use of discovery. Much discovery is merely a
tactic for delay or harassment. If a lawyer chooses to employ such tac-
tics, he should be prepared to suffer certain consequences. Court de-
lays will never be reduced if discovery can be used for purposes other
than its intended one, the acquisition of information necessary to con-
duct a lawsuit.
Definite Trial Dates. With the possible exception of imposing inter-
est on awards,, the most effective procedure for accelerating trial dates
cause civil cases to undergo settlement conferences; restrictions on continuances; and
mandatory appearance of parties at settlement conferences. The backlog of short cases was
reduced from 330 cases in 1978, with a five-month period between memoranda to "set for
trial" and trial, to a backlog of 94 cases in 1979 with a 45-day period between memoranda to
"set for trial" and trial. Mandatory arbitration is now required for all civil cases with a value
less than $15,000. The program is expected to remove up to 30% of the cases from the court's
long-cause civil calendar.
28. Hofstedler & Nejelski, supra note 13, at 967. "Los Angeles Superior Court Judge August
Goebel has combined telephone motions with a tentative ruling procedure to reduce in-court
argument substantially. In more than seventy percent of cases having an oral argument, the
telephone is used by one or more parties. The telephone is used similarly in Baltimore, Md.,
United States District Court in Spokane, Wash., Court of Appeals, Division II1."
29. Id. "Existing rules deal with discovery abuse, but recent studies have confirmed the general
feeling that lawyers are reluctant to ask for and judges are reluctant to use these sanctions."
[Vol. 8:16
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is to require courts to both set and keep definite trial dates. On the date
for trial, plaintiffs and defendant's counsel (or their substitutes, if nec-
essary) would be required to appear. The judge could not delay the
case, in the absence of a substantial showing of prejudice. Presiding
judges should place severe restrictions on all continuances. If such a
rigid system is to function effectively, institution of a system of substi-
tute judges, as well as a requirement for substitute attorneys, is a neces-
sity.
Bifurcated Trials. Under a bifurcated trial procedure, the issues of
liability and damage are tried separately. If the defendant obtains a
verdict on the issue of liability, there is no need to present evidence
regarding the amount of damages.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois used this split trial procedure for the years 1960-61. 30 It was found
that juries brought in verdicts of no liability in about forty percent of
the personal injury trials. By employing the split trial procedure, the
district court saved the amount of time required to prove the amount of
damages in that percentage of trials.
Some commentators consider split trials a powerful remedy for
court congestion.3 A bifurcated appellate system may also reduce de-
lays in the disposition of civil cases. Texas has such an appellate sys-
tem, with a Court of Criminal Appeals and a separate Court of Civil
Appeals.32 The advantage of this bifurcated system is that the appeal
of a civil case can move at its own pace, without yielding to the prece-
dence normally given criminal cases.
Computer-based Information Systems. Finally, inadequate court in-
formation and communication techniques have contributed to the
backlog in our civil courts. The application of computer-based systems
for handling judicial information has revolutionized court procedures
in jurisdictions such as Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles
County.33 The computer's ability to store, process, transmit, and docu-
30. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 46.
31. Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1606 (1963).
Separation of issues will save, on the average, about 20 percent of the time that would
be required if these cases were tried under traditional rules. This savings derives from
the fact that in many cases separation makes the litigation of damages unnecessary.
This group includes all cases in which liability is denied, but also the majority of cases
in which liability is affirmed, because two out of three of these cases are likely to be
settled without trial of the damage issue. There is no evidence that this savings is
offset by a change in the settlement ratio prior to trial, in the frequency of jury waiv-
ers, or in the proportion of hung juries, any one of which factors-if affected--could
increase the courts' trial load.
Id. at 1624.
32. Todd, Appellate Delay in the Criminal Courts of Texas, 37 TEX. B.J. 454 (1974).
33. Blaine, Computer-Based Information Systems Can Help Solve Urban Court Problems, in SE-
LECTED READINGS, supra note 11, at 1 & 79. Blaine also suggests that "[tihe changes that
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ment large amounts of data at great speed is highly adaptable to the
high-volume, complex administration of urban courts.
Such a computer system would facilitate the processing of cases and
thus minimize delay in the following areas:
(a) Judicial Information System: The system would process judi-
cial data promptly and make it immediately available to judge-admin-
istrators for evaluation and action.
(b) Indexing: As each civil case is opened, the computer automati-
cally generates a unique index listing all relevant information.
(c) Docketing: When a civil suit is filed, required information is
recorded at each stage through ultimate disposition. Data made avail-
able in this manner could include status of the case, type of trial re-
quested, type of case, names of attorneys, continuances of motions,
data on settlement negotiations, demands by plaintiff, and offers by
defendant.
(d) Scheduling: The computer helps maintain a conffict-free as-
signment schedule. Information is fed in daily and coordinated with
data on attorney commitments and on the status of current cases. As a
result, more cases are called and settled.
(e) Jury Management: Names for jury duty are taken from county
records and loaded into the data bank. This master list is run against
lists of persons generally not used as jurors to produce a mailing list of
eligible jurors.
(f) General Accounting: The judicial information system routinely
handles all calculations necessary for general accounting functions. It
provides the necessary controls on the collection and disbursement of
the millions of dollars received annually in satisfaction of litigant
claims and support payments. Trusts set up under computers can also
manage trusts set up under the court's jurisdiction.
The accounting functions involve such operations as the allocation
of expenses and the proper assignment of interest accruals. The com-
puter tracks these functions from one trust account to another. Audit
trails are enmeshed in the tracking process. The allocation and dis-
bursement of monies received are highlighted as they pass through the
various accounting statements of the trust, such as the income state-
ment.34
CONCLUSION
Bold steps must be taken to eliminate the unnecessary delay in civil
litigation. Congested court dockets, delaying tactics of counsel, and in-
ertia in the legal system have worked great hardships for citizens whose
injuries our court system was designed to recompense. At present, the
system only rewards the culpable, at the expense of the deserving. In
order to remedy this stagnation, the article has proposed four reforms:
have created great problems for our judicial system can be matched by the changes implied
in our new technologies." Id at 138.
34. Id. at 179.
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first, the development of surrogate judges and referees to handle certain
matters; second, the imposition of interest, retroactive to the incident
giving rise to the cause of action; third, the elevation of certain civil
cases to parity with criminal cases; and fourth, a requirement that
judges set definite trial dates and honor them. The use of modem com-
puter-based administrative techniques will also help to unburden the
court systems. By adapting these proposed reforms, the American legal
system can once again provide speedy and effective relief to its civil
litigants.
